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Who’s Holding Out?
An Experimental Study of the Benefits and Burdens of Eminent Domain*

By Abel M. Winn and Matthew W. McCarter
Abstract
A substantial literature identifies seller holdout as a serious obstacle to land assembly, implying
that eminent domain is an appropriate policy response. We conduct a series of laboratory
experiments to test this view. We find that when there is no competition and no eminent domain,
land assembly suffers from costly delay and failed assembly; participants lose 18.1% of the
available surplus.

Much of the inefficiency is due to low offers from the buyers (“buyer

holdout”) rather than strategic holdout among sellers.

When buyers can exercise eminent

domain the participants lose 18.6% of the surplus. This loss comes from spending money to
influence the fair market price and forcing sellers to sell even when the sellers value the property
more than the buyer. Introducing weak competition in the form of a less valuable substitute
parcel of land reduces delay by 35.7% and virtually eliminates assembly failure, so that only
11.5% of the surplus is lost.
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1

I. Introduction

2

A substantial theoretical literature identifies seller holdout as a significant impediment to

3

efficient land assembly (Calabresi and Malamed 1972, Eckart 1985, Bittlingmayer 1988, Cohen

4

1991, Epstein 1992, 1993, Strange 1995 and Menezes and Pitchford 2004) and a possible

5

justification for eminent domain (Allen 2000, Miceli and Sirmans 2007, Rose 2011). Suppose,

6

for example, that two landowners with adjoining property each value their own parcel at

7

$100,000 and a developer wishes to acquire both parcels. The development is such that both

8

parcels are necessary for its completion. His maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP) is $0 for

9

either one of the parcels but $250,000 for the pair. This may impede efficient assembly because

10

both sellers are in a position to hold out for a large share of the surplus. Strategic holdout can

11

draw out the bargaining process, causing costly delay or assembly failure. This is especially

12

likely if the negotiating parties face uncertainty about one another’s valuations for the land

13

(Shupp, et al. 2013).

14

The holdout problem in land assembly is a special case of the tragedy of the

15

anticommons (Heller 1998, Buchanan and Yoon 2000, Fennell 2004). An anticommons is a

16

property regime in which multiple agents have the unilateral right to prevent the use of a

17

resource. Examples include water rights transfers (Corbin 2011), assembling pharmaceutical

18

patents (Heller and Eisenberg 1998) and assembling contiguous blocks of the broadcast spectrum

19

(Hazlett 2008, 2014). In each case, too many agents with veto power can hinder a resource’s use

20

and reduce economic efficiency.

21

In the case of land assembly, eminent domain allows a developer to reduce delay and

22

ensure assembly by forcing a recalcitrant landowner to sell her property. However, eminent

23

domain may lead to inefficient assembly and invite influence costs. Inefficient assembly occurs

24

where the sum of the fragmented owners’ values for their land exceeds the value of the
2
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25

development but they are forced to sell. As Munch (1976) points out, the danger of under-

26

assembly through market mechanisms is mirrored by the danger of over-assembly through

27

eminent domain (see also O’Flaherty, 1994; Miceli and Segerson, 2007; Shavell, 2010).

28

The threat of inefficient assembly is not idle speculation. In the case of Kelo v. New

29

London the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of transfering private land to a private

30

developer. The main beneficiary was to be Pfizer, Inc., which would receive a $300 million

31

research center. The case was decided in 2005 and seven families were evicted from their

32

property, their houses demolished or moved offsite. Yet the development group never managed

33

to raise financing and gave up the project in 2008. Pfizer left the city of New London the

34

following year. As of 2015 the land where Ms. Kelo and her six neighbors lived remained an

35

undeveloped field.

36

Eminent domain also imposes influence costs in determining the “fair market value” of

37

the land; i.e., the price that is to be paid to the owner. This price is determined through a legal

38

process in which both the buyer and seller(s) must, at the very least, obtain counsel and pay for

39

separate and independent appraisals of the property. Both sides improve their chances of a

40

favorable price by expending more resources on the legal process relative to their opponent.

41

The result of the legal process is that much of the surplus may be spent influencing the

42

final price.

43

purchase a portion of one resident’s property for $120,000. The city spent $180,000 in legal fees

44

(Valine 2013).

45

participants in contests (like a court battle) frequently overspend relative to their Nash

46

Equilibrium strategies. For a survey of the literature, see Dechenaux, Kovenock and Sheremeta

47

(2015).

In 2013 the city of Modesto, California used eminent domain proceedings to

Moreover, more than two decades of experimental work has shown that

3

48

A number of experimental studies of land assembly demonstrate that seller holdout does

49

occur and can be costly. (We provide an overview of these results in the following section.) This

50

has led some investigators to suggest that eminent domain may be a necessary tool for efficient

51

land aggregation (Swope, et al. 2011, Cadigan, et al. 2011). However, to date the experimental

52

study of efficiency under a regime of eminent domain versus secure property is limited to a

53

single study (Kitchens and Roomets 2015) that omits several important features of the land

54

assembly problem. Delay in assembly is costless in their experiments, court fees are born only

55

by the buyer and determined exogenously, the court-determined price is known with certainty to

56

all parties and assembly is efficient in all negotiations.

57

In this paper we provide a comparison between secure property and eminent domain that

58

incorporates inefficient assembly and influence costs.

59

enhancing in our experiments. Participants captured 81.9% of the available surplus when buyers

60

had no alternative to assembly and no recourse to eminent domain. They captured 81.4% of the

61

available surplus when buyers could exercise eminent domain and the fair market price was

62

determined by a contest in which both parties could improve their odds of winning by expending

63

more resources. In a third treatment the developer could buy a less valuable substitute parcel of

64

land instead of assembling parcels from the two primary sellers. Participants captured 88.5% of

65

the available surplus in this treatment.

Eminent domain is not efficiency

66

Interestingly, we find that buyers “hold out” more frequently than sellers. In the baseline

67

treatment with secure property and no competition the sellers rejected a profitable offer in 22.6%

68

of cases, while 60% of buyers’ final offers were lower than the profit-maximizing offer. The rate

69

of seller holdout was 6.7% in the treatment with competition and 4.3% in the treatment with

4

70

eminent domain. These rates do not differ statistically; weak competition was as effective at

71

breaking up seller holdout as eminent domain.

72

II. Prior Studies of Land Assembly

73

Two empirical papers use land sale data to estimate a premium for assembled land

74

compared to unassembled land. Cunningham (2013) uses GIS maps of Seattle, Washington to

75

identify assemblies that resulted in new construction between 2005 and 2007. He combines this

76

data with sale prices and property characteristics to estimate a hedonic regression. Cunningham

77

(2013) finds that properties that were assembled for new construction sold at a 17% premium.

78

Yuming, McMillen and Somerville (2016) study the assembly of small parcels in the

79

urban core of Hong Kong between 1991 and 1998. They find that parcels that were redeveloped

80

as part of a land assembly sold for a premium of 8 – 10% compared to parcels that were

81

redeveloped individually. The final parcel acquired in an assembly sold for a 12% premium.

82

Brooks and Lutz (2016) study land assembly in Los Angeles, California between 1999

83

and 2010. They use properties where the existing structure was torn down after sale as a control

84

group against which to compare properties that were assembled. They find that assembly

85

properties sold at a premium of 15% - 40% depending on the modelling specification.

86

These studies are consistent with seller holdout, but they are not conclusive. As Brooks

87

and Lutz (2016) point out, a premium for assembled land proves that there are frictions in land

88

assembly, but those frictions can come from private sources (e.g., holdout and strategic delay) or

89

public sources (e.g., restrictive zoning and building codes). It is not possible to determine how

90

much of the assembly premium is due to holdout with the data that Cunningham (2013),

91

Yuming, MicMillen and Somerville (2016) and Brooks and Lutz (2016) analyze.

5

92

A second difficulty in using field data to study holdout is that sellers who have put their

93

property up for sale (active sellers) likely have lower reservation prices than sellers who have

94

been approached by a developer (passive sellers). A buyer who wishes to redevelop a single

95

property bargains with active sellers and can expect to pay the prevailing market price. But a

96

buyer who needs multiple contiguous properties will almost certainly have to bargain with at

97

least one passive seller, who is in no hurry to sell and values her property above the market price.

98

Thus, assembled properties are likely to have higher reservation prices even in the absence of

99

private frictions.

100

Laboratory experiments offer a way of observing holdout directly and comparing land

101

assembly under alternative legal frameworks. Several laboratory studies have examined the

102

holdout problem. The most relevant for our research are those by Cadigan, et al. (2009, 2011),

103

Swope, et al. (2011), Collins and Isaac (2012), Parente and Winn (2012), Shupp, et al. (2013),

104

Cadigan, Schmitt and Swope (2014), Zillante, Read and Schwarz (2014), Kitchens and Roomets

105

(2015) and Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo (2016). We summarize these studies in Table 1, listing

106

the treatment variables the authors studied and the primary results.

107

Strategic holdout occurred in all of the studies, although failure to assemble land tended

108

to be infrequent. Across all of the studies in Table 1 there were 3,036 negotiations in which

109

assembly failure could occur. It occurred in 299 (9.8%) of them. Failure rates were lowest in

110

treatments where there was some competition among the sellers.

111

conducted experiments in which the assembler negotiated with three landowners but needed only

112

two parcels. Out of 64 groups none failed to assemble the necessary parcels. Parente and Winn

113

(2012) also conducted experiments in which the assembler (represented by the software) needed

114

two parcels and faced three landowners. Out of 768 negotiations where assembly failure was

6

Cadigan, et al. (2011)

115

possible, it occurred only 6 times, a failure rate of 0.8%. Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo (2016)

116

created competition in two ways. First, similar to Cadigan, et al. (2011) and Parente and Winn

117

(2012) they had two treatments in which a buyer faced four sellers but needed to assemble only

118

two or three parcels. Out of 64 negotiations across these treatments assembly failure occurred in

119

only five. In a third competitive treatment the buyer could either assemble all four of the

120

primary parcels or purchase a single parcel from an alternative seller.2 In this treatment one

121

negotiation failed out of 28.

122

The only experimental study of eminent domain of which we are aware was conducted by

123

Kitchens and Roomets (2015). In their experiments a buyer negotiated sequentially with four

124

sellers who each had a $4 private use value for their properties. If he successfully purchased all

125

four parcels the buyer received $50 minus the sum of negotiated prices. The sellers were paid

126

the prices they had negotiated if they sold voluntarily. The buyer’s and sellers’ values were

127

common knowledge. Once a seller agreed to a price it became common knowledge as well.

128

In one treatment the buyer used contingent contracts. Any seller in the sequence could

129

“walk away” from the negotiations, but this voided all prior contracts. In this case the sellers

130

each received a private use value of $4 for their property and the buyer was not paid. In the

131

other treatment all contracts were binding but the buyer could take properties through eminent

132

domain. Each time he invoked eminent domain the buyer paid the seller a predetermined price

133

of $4 and paid court fees of $8.50. The court fees were parameterized such that if the buyer took

134

all four properties the available gains from trade would be completely consumed.

135

Kitchens and Roomets (2015) found that prices were roughly the same under contingent

136

contracts and eminent domain. They also found that efficiency was statistically indistinguishable
2

The buyer had the same induced value for assembling the four smaller parcels as for purchasing the larger
alternative parcel. This is a key distinction between the design employed by Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo (2016) and
our design.
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137

across treatments. Participants captured an average of 91.7% of the available surplus with

138

contingent contracts and 93.2% with eminent domain. Thus, in their experimental environment

139

and institutions eminent domain was not welfare enhancing.

140

These results are informative and important, but Kitchens’ and Roomets’ (2015)

141

experimental design omits several features of the land assembly problem. First, they did not

142

incorporate costs of delayed assembly, so assembly failure was the only possible source of

143

inefficiency in their contingent contracts treatment. This is significant because strategic holdout

144

is a dominated strategy in a single-period negotiation with complete information. As noted

145

above, assembly failure does not occur frequently in land assembly experiments, thus the bulk of

146

inefficiency generally comes from costly delay. This omission may positively bias efficiency in

147

Kitchens’ and Roomets’ (2015) contingent contracts treatment.

148

Second, the buyer’s value for the assembled properties was always considerably greater

149

than the sum of the sellers’ private use values. Thus, assembly failure posed the largest threat to

150

efficiency, and this could only occur in the contingent contracts treatment. There was no

151

possibility of inefficient assembly in the eminent domain treatment. This may positively bias

152

efficiency in their eminent domain treatment.

153

Third, buyers and sellers in these experiments faced a known fair market price that was

154

equal to the sellers’ private use values. In actual cases of eminent domain the buyer and seller(s)

155

spend money in the courts because they expect to influence the price in their favor.

156

Finally, court costs in Kitchens’ and Roomets’ (2015) experiments were determined

157

exogenously and fell only on the buyer. In the field sellers often expend resources on the legal

158

process as well, and their levels of expenditure are decision variables. Thus the efficiency of

159

eminent domain is dependent to some extent on whether the two parties spend few resources in

8

160

court or many. Preventing the participants from making this decision on their own could bias

161

efficiency in their eminent domain treatment positively or negatively.

162

The fact that efficiency may be overstated in the contingent contracts treatment and

163

overstated or understated in the eminent domain treatment makes it difficult to apply Kitchens’

164

and Roomets’ (2015) results to policy with high confidence. We introduce an experimental

165

design that incorporates delay costs, inefficient assembly, an uncertain fair market price and

166

endogenous legal expenditures.

167

[Table 1 Here]

168

III. Experiment Design

169

A. Overview of the Negotiation Environment

170

Our experiment design is inspired by the work of Shupp et al. (2013), who investigated

171

land assembly under conditions of uncertainty regarding the valuations of the buyer and sellers.

172

We model an environment in which one buyer negotiates with two owners (the sellers) through a

173

finitely repeated process of offers and responses. 3 The buyer makes simultaneous independent

174

offers to the sellers, who may accept or reject them.

175

In our experiments each seller

had a private valuation,

, for his own parcel .

176

Valuations were denominated in “points” that were redeemed for cash at the end of the

177

experiment. The

178

support [

179

but his WTP for the pair of them was

180

support [

were drawn (with replacement) from a discrete uniform distribution with

] and ( )

] and

( )

. The buyer’s WTP for either of the parcels alone was zero,
, which was drawn from a uniform distribution with

. Note that assembly was efficient in expectation but was

3

Our experiments required the buyer to assemble both parcels to receive a payoff. See Asami (1988) and Asami
and Teraki (1990) for models that allows for assembling subsets of the parcels.
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181

inefficient with non-zero probability. Agents knew their own valuation but only the distributions

182

from which their counterparts’ valuations were drawn.

183

Negotiation lasted up to 5 periods, which was common knowledge. In each period the

184

buyer offered a bid,

185

only accept or reject an offer; they could not make a counteroffer. The bids were contingent: if

186

only one seller had accepted a bid by the end of period 5 the buyer did not purchase her parcel.

, to each seller who had not yet agreed to sell her parcel. Sellers could

187

Prolonged negotiation was costly. Following Cadigan, et al. (2009) we modeled the costs

188

of delay as a penalty assessed against all agents’ payoffs. Specifically, if both sellers accepted an

189

offer by period , then all payoffs were multiplied by

190

accepted their offers in period 1 there was no cost of delay, while the cost was nonzero and

191

monotonically increasing in all subsequent periods.

(

). Thus, if both sellers

192

We tested land assembly within this general negotiation environment in three treatment

193

conditions. In the first (Baseline) the buyer’s only profit opportunity was to purchase the parcels

194

from the sellers without recourse to eminent domain. In the second treatment (Competition) the

195

buyer could purchase a substitute parcel of land instead of assembling the fragmented parcels.

196

The substitute was not as valuable to the buyer as the fragmented parcels, however, so that the

197

competitive pressure on the sellers was weak. In the third treatment (Eminent Domain) the buyer

198

could invoke eminent domain and the parcel’s price was determined by a Tullock Contest. A

199

high or low price could result from the contest, and a contestant’s probability of achieving his

200

preferred price was proportional to the amount of money he spent in the contest.

201

B. Baseline Treatment: Secure Property

202
203

Participants made their decisions through an electronic computer interface.

In the

Baseline buyers and sellers saw a matrix of two squares labeled (1) and (2), which represented

10

204

the sellers’ parcels. In the first negotiating period the buyer submitted simultaneous private

205

offers to both sellers. Each seller saw her offer in her square of the matrix and indicated her

206

decision by clicking one of two buttons labelled “accept” and “reject.” Once a seller had

207

accepted an offer negotiations for her parcel concluded at the price she had agreed to. If at least

208

one seller had rejected her offer the negotiation went on to the next period. Contracts were

209

contingent; the buyer only paid a seller the agreed price if both sellers accepted an offer.
In a single-period negotiation the buyer’s optimal strategy is simple to calculate because

210
211

sellers should accept any offer

212

buyer has no reason to submit different offers to the two sellers, and so in equilibrium

213

Thus, we omit the subscripts in the following analysis.

. Since the

are drawn from the same distribution the
.

The buyer’s expected profit, ( ), is a function of his value and offers:

214

( )

(

)(

215

)
(1)

216

The first term in (1) is the profit earned by the buyer if both sellers accept and the second term is

217

the probability that his offers exceed both of the their values. Solving the first order condition of

218

(1) for

yields the equilibrium bid function:

219

(2)

220

With multiple bargaining periods it becomes difficult to succinctly model buyer behavior

221

after the first period because his best strategy will depend on his beliefs about the sellers.

222

Suppose at least one seller rejects her offer in period one. If the buyer believes that the sellers

223

would only reject an offer that is below their value then in the second period he will incorporate

11

224

any accepted offer into the first term of equation (1), substitute the first period

225

second term and solve for the new equilibrium offer. But if he believes that the sellers are

226

holding out strategically, then he will not change his offers in the second period. A third

227

possibility is that the buyer places a non-zero probability on the sellers rejecting strategically, in

228

which case he will revise his second period offer(s) upward, but by a smaller amount than if he

229

believed them to be sincere.

for

in its

230

In their turn, the sellers’ optimal behavior depends on their beliefs about the buyers’

231

beliefs. If they believe him to think they are strategic, then strategic holdout will not be

232

profitable because it will incur the delay cost without increasing the buyer’s offers in period two.

233

If they believe him to think they will only reject sincerely – i.e., reject offers below their values –

234

they will hold out in period 1 so long as the difference in equilibrium offers is greater than

235

.

236

The multiplicity of plausible outcomes implies that we cannot predict behavior in the

237

Baseline beyond period 1 with any confidence without knowing the beliefs of the agents.

238

However, earlier empirical work by Zillante, Read and Schwarz (2014) and Shupp, et al. (2013)

239

suggests that offers will rise over time. For the current study we will use the equilibrium offer

240

function as a benchmark for buyer offers in the first period.

241
242

C. Competition Treatment: Secure Property with a Substitute Parcel
In our Competition treatment the buyer faced the two sellers as in the Baseline, but also

243

had the option of buying a substitute parcel of land. The substitute parcel was displayed on

244

participants’ screens as a rectangle to the right of the matrix representing the primary parcels.

245

For clarity we will refer to the two fragmented parcels as the “primary parcels” and their owners

246

as the “primary sellers.” We will refer to the owner of the substitute parcel as the “alternative

247

seller.” The buyer’s induced value for the substitute parcel was 80% of his induced value for
12

248

the two primary parcels. The substitute parcel was of no additional value to the buyer if he

249

purchased both of the primary parcels.

250

The buyer initially made his offers to the primary sellers as in the Baseline. If one or

251

both of them rejected his offer, the buyer then submitted an offer to the alternative seller. The

252

delay cost for the period was only incurred if the alternative seller rejected her offer. Contracts

253

were contingent, as above.

254

The alternative seller had a valuation for her parcel,

255

distribution [

256

primary parcels was

257

buying the substitute parcel was 0.8 ( )

258

substitute parcel was not socially optimal on average.

259
260

] with ( )
( )

, that was drawn from the uniform

. Notice that the expected surplus from assembling the
( )

, while the expected surplus from
( )

, so purchasing the

We again use the one-period model as our benchmark. If the buyer is forced to make an
offer to the alternative seller, his expected profit function is:
(

)

(

)(

)

261
262

(3)
Solving the first order condition of (3) for

yields the equilibrium alternative bid function:

263

(4)

264

This implies that in equilibrium the buyer’s expected profit from dealing with the alternative

265

seller is:
(

)

(

266

)

(5)

13

267
268

Given that failing to assemble the primary parcels will still generate an expected profit of
(

), the buyer’s expected profit when he is making an offer to the primary sellers is now:
( )

(

)(

(

)

)(

(

) )

269
270

(6)
We may solve the first order condition of (6) for

to find the equilibrium offer function:
(

)

271

(7)

272

Comparing the equilibrium offer functions (2) and (7) we see that the presence of the alternative

273

seller reduces the buyer’s equilibrium offers to the primary sellers by one third of the expected

274

profit from dealing with the alternative seller.

275

Allowing for multiple periods causes equilibrium behavior to become ambiguous for the

276

reasons discussed in the previous section.

277

Competition treatment due to the risk that the buyer would commit to a contract with the

278

competing party (or parties).

279

environment.

280

D. Eminent Domain Treatment

However, seller holdout was riskier in the

Consequently, we expect to see less seller holdout in this

281

In the Eminent Domain treatment the buyer was allowed to force a seller who had

282

rejected his offer to sell. This was done by clicking a button labelled “Force Sale” next to a

283

seller’s property. If the buyer invoked eminent domain the fair market value was decided

284

through a simulated litigation process. The price the buyer paid was determined by the amount

285

he and the seller spent on litigation. Neither the buyer nor the seller were allowed to spend so

286

much that they could make negative earnings. The most the seller could spend was equal to the

14

287

low price that could result from the contest. The most that the buyer could spend was calculated

288

based on his value and any price he had already agreed to or other contest he was in. This

289

maximum was set so that even if the buyer had to pay the high price in the contest his total

290

expenditures would not exceed his value. The delay cost was incurred at the end of a period only

291

if at least one seller rejected her offer and the buyer did not force her to sell.

292

If the buyer and seller spent nothing then the fair market value was 50, the lower bound

293

of the seller’s value distribution. This is consistent with a prevailing market price of land less

294

than or equal to all landowner’s valuations. If one or both spent an amount greater than zero

295

then the fair market price was assessed to be 40 if the buyer won the contest and 60 if the seller

296

won.4 The winner was determined probabilistically, with the probability that one contestant wins

297

equal to the amount he spends in the contest divided by the sum of both contestants’ spending.

298

Notice that the litigation process effectively offered the buyer and seller a prize equal to 20, the

299

difference between the high and low prices. We may therefore analyze the legal process as a

300

simple Tullock Contest. It is straightforward to show that with two players the Nash Equilibrium

301

in such a contest is for each party to spend one fourth of the prize (Chowdhury and Sheremeta,

302

2011). Thus, we would expect the buyer and seller to each spend 5 points if the buyer forced a

303

sale.

304

Of course, the influence costs of a court battle should act as a deterrent to invoking

305

eminent domain in the first place. The buyer knows that if he takes the seller to court the seller’s

306

expected profit will be equal to the expected price she will receive minus the amount she spends

307

in court costs. Thus, the buyer’s optimal bid offers the sellers an amount that leaves them

4

This range of prices is conservative. Munch (1976) found that eminent domain prices ranged from 28% below her
estimate of market value to more than 100% above it. More recently, Chang (2010) estimated the fair market value
of condemned properties in New York City from 1990 – 2002. He found that for many properties compensation
was as low as 50% below fair market value and as high as 50% above it.

15

308

indifferent between accepting his offer and going to court. Given our parameters this means that

309

. Notice this implies that theoretically the threat of eminent domain is sufficient for land

310

assembly. We would therefore expect no forced sales in our Eminent Domain treatment.

311

E. Procedures

312

The parameters of the experiment are summarized in Table 2. Sellers earned their input

313

values even if they did not sell, while buyers only received payment if they assembled both

314

parcels. For this reason we varied the exchange rate between points and dollars by role. Buyers

315

received $1.00 for every 2 points, primary sellers $1.00 for every 4 points and alternative sellers

316

$1.00 for every 7 points due to their higher average input value. These exchange rates ensured

317

that all participants could earn roughly the same cash payment in the experiment. We kept the

318

exchange rates private, but told the participants that their counterparts’ exchange rates may be

319

different from their own. The combination of uncertain value draws and private exchange rates

320

made it very difficult for participants to infer their counterpart’s earnings. As a result, we would

321

expect other-regarding preferences to be minimized (Cooper and Kagel, 2015).

322

[Table 2 Here]

323

We recruited 150 undergraduate and graduate students at a university in the American

324

Southwest. The participants came from a pool of approximately 2,000 who had signed up in

325

advance to participate in economic experiments. Each participant was in only one treatment.

326

We paid them $7 for attending plus earnings that they received from their decisions in the

327

experiment ($16.22 on average). Experimental sessions lasted 30 – 60 minutes, including time

328

for instructions.

329
330

Participants sat at desks separated by privacy dividers.

Each received a half-page

summary of the rules of the experiment as well as important parameter information, such as the
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331

distributions from which values would be drawn. An experimenter read the instructions aloud

332

from a script, pausing at predetermined points to elicit questions and answer them. We projected

333

screenshots of the user interface on a screen at the front of the laboratory.

334

We described the decision space as neutrally as possible to focus the participants’

335

attention on their own profit calculations rather than their personal feelings about eminent

336

domain. We called the parcels of land “inputs” that the buyer wished to purchase and referred to

337

a “forced sale” rather than eminent domain or condemnation, and a “contest” rather than a

338

litigation process.

339

Negotiations in all treatments were strictly private. Sellers never saw one another’s

340

offers, nor were they informed whether another seller had accepted her offer except when the

341

buyer succeeded in assembling the primary inputs or bought the alternative input. In the Eminent

342

Domain treatment sellers did not know if the other seller in their group had been forced to sell.

343

When competing in a contest neither contestant was told how much their opponent had spent.

344

Each experiment session consisted of 3 rounds.

345

Participants took the same role in every round, but were matched into different groups. To keep

346

the negotiations independent across rounds we re-matched the participants so that they were

347

never grouped with any of the same counterparts more than once. This prevented participants

348

from rewarding or punishing one another for their decisions in prior rounds. The number of

349

rounds and uniqueness of each round’s grouping was common knowledge. After the third round

350

the computer software randomly chose one of the rounds for each participant. The participant

351

was paid according to his earnings in that round’s negotiation.

Each round was a separate negotiation.

352

To facilitate unique groups we conducted the Baseline and Eminent Domain treatments in

353

sessions with nine participants organized into three groups – three buyers and six sellers. This
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354

allowed us to obtain nine observations from each session. For the Competition treatment every

355

session used twenty participants organized into five groups – five buyers, ten primary sellers and

356

five alternative sellers.

357

conducted 5 sessions of the Baseline and Eminent Domain treatments and three sessions of the

358

Competition treatment, giving us 45 negotiations for each treatment. (See Table 3.)

This allowed us to obtain fifteen observations per session.

359

[Table 3 Here]

360

IV. Experiment Results

361

A. Benchmark simulations and an overview of results

362

We

We conducted simulations to find the best-case outcomes that could occur in our

363

experiments if buyers submitted their equilibrium offers and sellers did not hold out.

364

Baseline and Competition simulations the sellers accepted offers greater than or equal to their

365

values and this was known to the buyers. The simulated buyers responded to rejected offers by

366

revising their offers upward optimally in the subsequent period. In the simulated Eminent

367

Domain treatment sellers always accepted their offers, so that the buyers never invoked eminent

368

domain. For each treatment we used the same parameter draws as those in the experiments with

369

human participants. We recorded the buyers’ opening offers, number of negotiating periods,

370

efficiency and the use of eminent domain. This provides us with a benchmark for comparison to

371

the outcomes from our experiments.

372

In the

[Table 4 Here]

373

Table 4 displays the results of our simulations for each treatment alongside the observed

374

results of our experiments. Participants in the Baseline performed below the benchmark. The

375

average opening offer was less than the average equilibrium offer. This, combined with some

376

holdout among sellers resulted in more delay in the experiments than in our simulations.
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377

Consequently, on average the participants captured only 81.2% of the available surplus on

378

average, compared to 88.5% in the simulations.

379

Outcomes in the Competition treatment were roughly equal to the benchmark. The

380

average opening offer of 64.4 was only 6% less than the average equilibrium offer of 68.5. The

381

number of negotiating periods was nearly identical in the simulations and the experiments. On

382

average the participants captured 89.9% of the available surplus, slightly more than the

383

benchmark of 89.5%.

384

In the Eminent Domain experiments the buyers’ offers were more generous to the sellers

385

than theory would predict. Nevertheless, many sellers did not accept their opening offers, which

386

led to some delay and many instances of forced sales. Across all negotiations 41.1% of sellers

387

were forced to sell their inputs. The high rate of eminent domain lead to considerable spending

388

to determine fair market prices. The average spending was 15.7 for buyers and 15.9 for sellers,

389

more than triple the equilibrium of 5. This resulted in an average efficiency of 80.6%, compared

390

to 95.1% in the benchmark simulations.

391

Notice that in our simulations the Eminent Domain treatment had the highest average

392

efficiency (95.1%), followed by Competition (89.5%) and the Baseline (88.5%). That is, the

393

experimental environment was the most favorable to achieving high levels of surplus with

394

eminent domain. Yet participants in the Eminent Domain treatment of the experiments captured

395

the least of the available surplus. Below we explore the results of our experiments in more

396

detail.

397

B. Buyer offers

398

In Figure 1 we present the average deviation of the buyers’ first and final offers from our

399

theoretical predictions for each treatment. In the Baseline treatment the average first period offer
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400

was 58.6, which is 22.7% below the average equilibrium offer of 75.8. This was not due to a

401

small number of outliers. Of the 45 first offers in the Baseline, 38 (84.4%) were below the

402

optimal offer given the buyer’s value. We compared the first period offers to those in the

403

benchmark simulations with a Wilcoxon sign rank test. The unit of analysis was the average of a

404

buyer’s two offers in the first period of the round. We can reject the null hypothesis that first

405

period offers in the Baseline treatment were no different from the equilibrium with high

406

confidence (p < 0.001).

407

[Figure 1 Here]

408

The Baseline offers did increase in subsequent periods, but remained overly conservative.

409

The average final offer in the Baseline was 69.5. 60% of these final offers were below the Nash

410

Equilibrium. A Mann-Whitney test comparing a buyer’s final offer of the round with his first

411

offer indicates that the difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001). However, even by the

412

end of negotiations the typical buyer in the Baseline offered the sellers 8.3% less than would

413

have been optimal in the first period (Wilcoxon sign rank test, p = 0.002).

414

The pattern was similar in the Competition treatment, but not as pronounced as the

415

Baseline. The average buyer’s value was 168 points, which implied an average first offer of

416

68.5. Buyers’ offers were 64.4 on average, or approximately 6% below equilibrium. The

417

difference between optimal and observed offers is marginally statistically significant (Wilcoxon

418

p = 0.059) but rather small in economic significance. The average final offer in the Competition

419

treatment was 70.1, which is not statistically different than the equilibrium first-period offer

420

(Wilcoxon, p = 0.592). Overall, 42.2% of first offers and 22.2% of final offers were below

421

equilibrium in the Competition treatment.
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422

Notice that introducing competition among the sellers was predicted to reduce buyers’

423

average offers by 7.3 points. Instead the buyers increased their offers by an average of almost 10

424

points. In the Baseline treatment buyers may have made low offers in an effort to avoid

425

overpaying one of the sellers and thereby constraining their ability to make an adequate offer to

426

the other. In the buyers’ minds this risk may have dominated the risk that making low offers

427

would drag out the negotiations and increase the risk of assembly failure. Overpaying a primary

428

seller was less of a concern in the Competition treatment because even if the buyer found himself

429

unable to make a sufficiently high offer to one of the primary sellers he might still negotiate a

430

contract with the alternative seller. Mann-Whitney tests do not find the distributions of first or

431

final offers to be statistically different between the Baseline and Competition treatments (p =

432

0.263 and p = 0.765). However, we also compared offers in these treatments by performing chi-

433

squared tests of the frequency of offering less than the equilibrium prediction. Buyers in the

434

Baseline were more likely to offer less than the equilibrium in both their first and final offers (p

435

< 0.001 in both cases).

436

While offers under secure property tended to be too low, under eminent domain the

437

buyers did not fully exploit the strength of their bargaining position. The average first offer was

438

56 in the Eminent Domain treatment. This is 24.4% higher than the equilibrium offer of 45, and

439

a Wilcoxon sign rank test indicates that the difference is statistically significant (p < 0.001). The

440

buyers may have been motivated by fear that sellers would view the equilibrium offer as unfair

441

and reject it to punish them. This would force both sides to spend money in the Tullock Contest,

442

and could be viewed as a form of costly punishment. Henrich, et al. (2006) have shown that the

443

willingness to engage in costly punishment is a feature of a wide range of human societies.

444
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445

C. Seller holdout

446

To analyze seller holdout, we found the highest offer that a seller rejected in a round and

447

subtracted her input value from it. Where this normalized highest rejected offer is greater than

448

zero we consider the seller to have withheld her input strategically. The cumulative distributions

449

of the normalized highest rejected offers are shown in Figure 2. A vertical line at the value of

450

zero separates the shares of each distribution that represent strategic rejections from sincere

451

rejections.

452

[Figure 2 Here]

453

Sellers in the Baseline strategically rejected the buyer’s offer in 22.6% of cases. Notice

454

that this is substantially less than the percentage of buyers in the same treatment who made offers

455

that were lower than the equilibrium. 60% of the buyers’ final offers were below equilibrium. If

456

we consider these low offers to be buyer holdout then buyers held out 2.7 times as often as

457

sellers. Moreover, in Section IV d. below we demonstrate that the loss of efficiency from delay

458

was mainly due to buyer holdout. Our findings run counter to the conventional wisdom that

459

sellers are primarily responsible for the difficulties of land assembly.

460

In the Competition treatment the primary sellers strategically rejected far fewer offers. In

461

6.7% of cases a primary seller’s highest rejected offer exceeded her value, a 70.4% reduction

462

compared to the Baseline. A chi-square analysis confirms that holdout was statistically less

463

frequent in the Competition treatment compared to the Baseline (p = 0.013). The effect of

464

competition on strategic holdout is especially impressive when we compare it to eminent

465

domain. Sellers in the Eminent Domain treatment rejected profitable offers in 4.3% of cases. A

466

chi-square test cannot reject the null hypothesis that holdout rates were equal in the Eminent
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467

Domain and Competition treatments (p = 0.609).

468

competition was just as effective at discouraging seller holdout as eminent domain.

469

D. Efficiency

That is, introducing a weak form of

470

Eminent domain did not increase the gains from trade, but weak competition did. As we

471

noted above average efficiency was highest in the Competition treatment (89.9%), followed by

472

the Baseline (81.2%) and Eminent Domain treatments (80.6%). We compared the outcomes

473

across treatments with pair-wise Mann-Whitney tests.

474

indistinguishable between the Baseline and Eminent Domain treatment (p = 0.971), but it was

475

statistically significantly higher in the Competition treatment than in the Baseline (p = 0.012) and

476

Eminent Domain treatments (p = 0.045).

477

Efficiency was statistically

[Table 5 Here]

478

In Table 5 we provide complete information regarding the number of points that could

479

have been earned in each treatment, along with how many points were earned and the number of

480

points that were lost due to the various possible sources of inefficiency.

481

participants failed to capture a total of 1,498 points, or 18.1% of the available surplus. Of these,

482

1,237 points (82.6%) were lost due to delay, and 225 (15%) were lost due to assembly failure.

483

We have already noted that both sellers and buyers held out in the form of rejected offers above

484

seller’s values and offers below Nash equilibrium. Which form of holdout cost more in terms of

485

lost gains from trade? We addressed this question by simulating two counterfactuals: a no seller

486

holdout (NSH) counterfactual and a no buyer holdout (NBH) counterfactual. For the NSH

487

counterfactual we simulated buyers whose offers were identical to those submitted by the human
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In the Baseline

488

buyers and sellers who accepted all offers that were greater than or equal to their value.5 This

489

allows us to measure how efficient the negotiations would have been without seller holdout,

490

holding observed buyer decisions constant.

491

counterfactual; one for each negotiation in the experiments.

We conducted 45 simulations for the NSH

492

For the NBH counterfactual we simulated buyers who submitted their equilibrium offers

493

and sellers who accepted the offers probabilistically. We constructed an acceptance probability

494

function using the decisions that the human sellers had made in our experiments. For each offer

495

that a human seller had accepted we subtracted the seller’s value from the offer to find the

496

normalized accepted offer. The probability that a simulated seller in the NBH counterfactual

497

accepted its offer was equal to the proportion of human sellers who had accepted a normalized

498

offer of equal or lesser value. This allows us to measure how efficient the negotiations would

499

have been without buyer holdout, holding observed seller behavior constant.

500

probabilistic nature of the simulated sellers’ decisions we conducted 1,000 simulations for each

501

negotiation in the experiments, for a total of 45,000.

502

Due to the

[Figure 3 Here]

503

Figure 3 displays the average efficiency in the observed Baseline negotiations, as well as

504

those in the NSH and NBH counterfactuals. As the chart makes clear, buyer holdout was more

505

detrimental to efficiency than seller holdout. In the NSH counterfactual the average efficiency

506

was 84%; only 2.8 percentage points higher than the observed Baseline efficiency. For the NBH

507

counterfactual the average efficiency was 90.2%; 9 percentage points higher than the human

508

participants achieved.

509

Wilcoxon sign rank tests (p = 0.033 for NSH, p < 0.001 for NBH). Notice that average

Both of these differences are statistically significant according to

5

In some cases sellers in the laboratory experiments accepted offers that were below their values. We replicated
these decisions in the NSH counterfactual, so that the simulated sellers never rejected an offer that had been
accepted by their human counterparts.
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510

efficiency was higher in the NBH simulations than in our benchmark simulations. This is

511

because the human sellers accepted offers below their values in 52.9% of cases, most likely to

512

avoid delay costs. As a result, negotiations lasted for an average of 2.8 periods in the NBH

513

simulations versus 3.3 periods in the benchmark simulations. In the NSH simulations and

514

laboratory experiments the average negotiation took 3.9 and 4.2 periods respectively.

515

Participants were able to capture the highest share of the surplus in the Competition

516

treatment. Average efficiency was 89.9% in the Competition treatment compared to 81.2% in

517

the Baseline. This was primarily due to a reduction in delay. The average duration was 2.7

518

periods for all Competition negotiations and 2.1 for those where there was positive surplus

519

available from assembly. Wilcoxon sign rank tests indicate that these were not statistically

520

different than the benchmark simulation averages of 3 and 1.8 (p > 0.25 in both cases).

521

The buyers in the Competition treatment made a purchase in 93.8% of negotiations where

522

there were positive gains from trade. They purchased the parcel(s) that generated the higher

523

surplus 65.6% of the time. For each negotiation where the buyer’s purchase generated less

524

surplus than if he had negotiated an agreement with the other seller(s), we calculated the

525

difference in surplus between the two possible contracts. This allows us to determine the

526

opportunity cost in efficiency from purchasing the wrong input(s). The total opportunity cost

527

was 304 points, which is only 2.2% of the available surplus in the Competition treatment.

528

Average efficiency was 80.6% in the Eminent Domain treatment, which is not

529

statistically different than in the Baseline. Delay and failed assembly did not substantially affect

530

efficiency in the Eminent Domain treatment. Only two negotiations failed to result in assembly

531

because the buyer could not afford to force both sellers to sell. In both of these negotiations the

532

sellers valued their inputs more than the buyer, so no points were lost from assembly failure.
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533

The average duration was 1.4 periods for all negotiations and 1.2 periods for negotiations with

534

gains from trade. As a result, only 157 points (1.9% of available surplus) were lost due to delay.

535

However, spending in the Tullock Contest was more than 200% higher than predicted. In

536

theory the buyer and seller should both spend 5 points. In fact, buyers spent an average of 15.7

537

points and sellers an average of 15.9 points. These high averages were due in part to very high

538

spending by a few participants. However, median spending was 10 points for both buyers and

539

sellers; 100% higher than equilibrium. Wilcoxon sign rank tests confirm that spending was

540

statistically higher than equilibrium for buyers and sellers (p < 0.01 for both roles). This is

541

consistent with prior studies on spending in Tullock Contests (see Dechenaux, Kovenock and

542

Sheremeta, 2015)

543

Since litigation costs were the main cause of efficiency loss in the Eminent Domain

544

treatment it is reasonable to consider how sensitive our results are to the variance in prices that

545

could result from the contest. Our parameters required the litigated price to be either 40 or 60;

546

i.e., 20% above or below the true fair market value. The litigated price range determines the size

547

of the contest’s prize. Consequently, we would expect a direct relationship between the width of

548

the prices and the level of spending.

549

To estimate the sensitivity of our results to the litigated price range we recalculated the

550

efficiency in the Eminent Domain treatment according to two counterfactuals.

551

counterfactuals we assumed that the contestants spent a fixed fraction of the prize. This fraction

552

was calculated for each contestant using the observed spending amounts for the numerator and

553

the observed prize (20 points) in the denominator. In one counterfactual (narrow range) we

554

reduced the litigated price range to be 10% above or below the fair market value. In the second
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In both

555

counterfactual (wide range) we followed the estimates of Chang (2010) that litigated range from

556

50% below fair market value (25 points) to 50% above it (75 points).

557

In our narrow range counterfactual average efficiency in the Eminent Domain treatment

558

increased to 87.6%, statistically significantly greater than the Baseline (Mann-Whitney test, p =

559

0.022). This indicates that where courts face less uncertainty over fair market value eminent

560

domain is likely to be more efficient. However, in the wide range counterfactual the average

561

efficiency is 61.4%, which is statistically significantly less than the Baseline (Mann-Whitney

562

test, p = 0.031). Given that the wide range counterfactual is based on empirical estimates, it is

563

reasonable to treat the results of our laboratory experiments as an optimistic comparison of the

564

efficiency of eminent domain versus sovereign property rights. We advise caution in relying on

565

these counterfactual results, however, because they rely on the assumption that spending

566

strategies do not vary with the range of litigated prices.

567

Theoretically, sellers should accept any offer of 45 points or higher, and the average first

568

offer in the Eminent Domain treatment was 56 points. Thus, we would expect litigation to be

569

infrequent, but that was not the case. The buyer invoked eminent domain against at least one

570

seller in 44.4% of negotiations and against both sellers in 11.1% of negotiations. As a result,

571

participants spent 1,149 points to influence the fair market price. This accounts for 73.9% of all

572

points lost in the Eminent Domain treatment and 13.7% of the maximum available surplus.

573

Notice that this is almost the same amount that was lost due to delay in the Baseline. What

574

eminent domain gave through faster negotiation it took away through influence costs.

575

V. General Discussion

576

The results of these experiments push our understanding about eminent domain and

577

collective action in three ways. First, we find that – contrary to the conventional wisdom – a
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578

large majority of sellers do not hold out even when the buyer has no alternative to assembly or

579

recourse to eminent domain. Rather, in our experiments it was primarily the buyers who held out

580

for an outsized share of the surplus by making offers that were below the profit maximizing

581

level, and buyer holdout was 3 times as costly as seller holdout. It seems a perverse response

582

under such circumstances to give buyers the right to cut short the bargaining process and force

583

the sale of property.

584

treatments suggests that buyers held out to avoid overpaying one seller, leaving them with

585

insufficient funds to offer an acceptable price to the other. If this is the case it suggests that

586

competition among sellers is important not only to break up seller holdout, but to give buyers

587

flexibility in how they achieve assembly, resulting in higher offers.

The pattern of buyer holdout across the Baseline and Competition

588

Second, eminent domain did not enhance the efficiency of negotiated outcomes. The

589

surplus that was saved by avoiding delay was spent in litigation costs. One possible policy

590

response would be to curtail or eliminate the degree to which litigants can influence the price of

591

condemned property. Yet such a policy would run directly counter to democratic principles of

592

due process, and it would also open landowners to predatory behavior on the part of government

593

officials. An alternative policy response would be to place a high burden on the party invoking

594

eminent domain to demonstrate that the gains from assembling the properties is very large.

595

Eminent domain ought not to be invoked to achieve modest improvements in land use due to the

596

risk that influence costs will meet or exceed the gains from trade.

597

Third, we find that even weak competition is sufficient to break down seller holdout and

598

improve economic efficiency. When our buyers had an outside option to assembling the primary

599

sellers’ parcels, seller holdout was not statistically higher than when the buyers could force a

600

sale. Having an available substitute also increased the buyers’ offers relative to the theoretical
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601

equilibrium. The availability of a substitute parcel reduced the duration of negotiations by

602

35.7% overall (from 4.2 periods to 2.7 periods) and almost no surplus was lost due to assembly

603

failure. Comparing weak competition to eminent domain, participants captured 7.1 percentage

604

points more of the available surplus under competition.

605

The result that weak competition helps to navigate seller holdout strengthens the findings

606

of Cadigan et al. (2011), Parente and Winn (2012) and Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo (2016) that

607

competition among sellers makes land assembly quite easy. Notice that in their studies the

608

sellers competed with perfect substitutes, while in the present study the buyer incurred a 20%

609

loss in value from buying the alternative parcel. A straightforward implication for policy is that

610

eminent domain should be restricted to cases where the assembling agent has no viable

611

alternative to assembling a single set of properties. An example would be the construction of a

612

road through a mountain range with a single pass. If the land along that pass is owned by

613

multiple parties then eminent domain may be necessary to prevent strategic holdout from

614

thwarting efficient assembly. But suppose there is a second pass that is less suitable for a road,

615

perhaps because it is further from the existing infrastructure or takes a more circuitous route

616

through the mountains. In this case eminent domain is less likely to be justified because an

617

element of competition has been introduced which will break down seller holdout.

618

More broadly, our findings also contribute to the study of the tragedy of the

619

anticommons, of which the land assembly problem is a special case. Legal research conjectures

620

that, without a superordinate authority the tragedy of the anticommons is inevitable. Indeed,

621

scholars have long endorsed placing a superordinate authority over shared resources to navigate

622

social dilemmas (e.g., Hardin 1968, Kollock 1998). Our findings highlight that a superordinate
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623

authority may reduce the negative externalities of seller holdout while imposing externalities of

624

its own.

625

The anticommons literature – and social dilemma research in general – typically assumes

626

that resource management is a closed system with no outside alternatives; e.g., there is only one

627

configuration of land amenable to development or one set of patents that will permit a suitable

628

pharmaceutical treatment. Relaxing this assumption and taking an open system approach to the

629

tragedy of the anticommons, as we have done with land assembly, introduces an effective

630

substitute for superordinate authority.

631

Our study does have some important limitations. First, we did not vary the number of

632

sellers, so we cannot measure how the degree of fragmentation interacts with the results reported

633

here. Cadigan, et al. (2011) have demonstrated that delay is exacerbated and assembly failure

634

more common with a larger numbers of sellers. Future research may benefit from examining

635

whether the number of sellers makes land assembly more challenging, especially if sellers are

636

allowed to form coalitions against prospective buyers. Second, we did not vary environmental

637

parameters, such as the magnitude of delay cost or the duration of the eminent domain process.

638

Varying those parameters could affect the relative efficiencies of our Baseline and Eminent

639

Domain treatments. However, it is worth noting that Kitchens and Roomets (2015) also find that

640

eminent domain does not increase efficiency in experiments that are distinct from our own.

641

Finally, there were no externalities from assembly in our experiments, which may encourage

642

seller holdout (O’Flaherty 1994). Future scholarship may benefit from examining whether the

643

knowledge of positive versus negative externalities to those directly involved in the land

644

assembly impact seller holdouts.
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Table 1. Summary of laboratory experiments of land assembly and holdout.
Study
Cadigan, Schmitt, Shupp
and Swope (2009)

Treatment Variables
1. Single period vs. multiperiod bargaining
2. Costly vs. costless delay
3. Buyer proposes vs. sellers propose

Cadigan, Schmitt, Shupp
and Swope (2011)

1. Number of sellers (1 – 4)
2. Costly delay (only with 2 – 4 sellers)
3. Competition (only with 3 sellers)
4. Buyer proposes vs. seller(s) propose(s)

Swope, Wielgus, Cadigan
and Schmitt (2011)

1. Single period vs. multiperiod bargaining
2. Simultaneous vs. sequential bargaining
3. Contingent vs. non-contingent contracts

Collins and Isaac (2012)

1. Contingent contracts vs. non-contingent
contracts with a capital constraint
2. Private vs. public information regarding
buyers’ willingness to pay, capital
constraint, offers and acceptances
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Main Findings
1. Single period bargaining and costly delay made offers
more generous and holdout less likely,
2. Both buyers and sellers rejected profitable proposals.
3. 19 of 174 negotiations failed (10.9%). Of these, 18 were
in single period treatments.
1. Without competition, buyers’ surplus fell monotonically
with the number of sellers, regardless if buyers or sellers
were proposing.
2. Without competition, delay increased with the number of
Sellers.
3. Competition reduced delay and increased the buyers’
Surplus.
4. 8 of 300 negotiations failed (2.7%). Of these, 6 were in
treatments with 4 sellers. None were in treatments with
competing sellers.
1. 36 of 175 negotiations failed (20.6%).
2. Single period negotiations failed more frequently than
multiperiod negotiations (29.4% vs. 12.2%).
3. Sequential negotiations failed somewhat more frequently
than Simultaneous negotiations (16.7% vs. 12.5%).
4. Negotiations failed more frequently with non-contingent
contracts than with contingent contracts (32.2% vs.
16.7%).
1. Negotiations failed more frequently with constrained
non-contingent contracts than with contingent contracts
(6% vs. 54%).
2. Negotiation failure was equally likely with private and
public information.
3. Sellers who held out did not earn more on average than
sellers who did not.

4. Buyers’ expected earnings were equal with contingent
and non-contingent contracts, but variance was lower
with non-contingent contracts.
Parente and Winn (2012)
1. Simultaneous vs. sequential offers to
1. Final prices were lower with a) simultaneous offers than
sellers
sequential offers, b) low signals of WTP than uncertain
2. Low vs. high vs. uncertain signals of the
or high signals, and c) partial complementarity than full
buyer’s maximum willingness to pay
complementarity.
(WTP)
2. With strict complementarity 14% of negotiations failed.
3. Strict complementarity (3 of 3 parcels
Failure rates were lower with sequential offers than
must be assembled) vs. partial
simultaneous offers.
complementarity (2 of 3 parcels must be 3. With partial complementarity less than 1% of
assembled)
negotiations failed.
Shupp, Cadigan, Schmitt
1. Buyer proposes (first) vs. sellers propose 1. 7 of 182 (3.8%) of negotiations failed.
and Swope (2013)
(first)
2. 5 of the failed negotiations (71.4%) occurred when
2. Persistent proposer role vs. alternating
values and costs were uncertain.
proposers role
3. Final prices favored the (first) proposer.
3. Buyer’s value and sellers’ costs known
4. Final prices were not significantly different when the
(certain) vs. value and costs drawn from
buyer and sellers alternated proposals than when one side
known distributions (uncertain)
proposed persistently.
Cadigan, Schmitt and
1. Buyer proposes vs. sellers propose
1. Proposing buyers earned more when they had the option
Swope (2014)
2. Costly vs. costless delay
to make an ultimatum offer. Proposing sellers earned
3. Symmetric delay costs to the buyer and
less when they could make an ultimatum offer.
sellers vs. delay costs to the buyer only
2. A larger share of surplus went to sellers when delay costs
4. Multi-round negotiation required vs.
were asymmetric.
credible commitment to ultimatum offer 3. 16 of 235 negotiations failed (6.8%). Of these, 15
(93.8%) were in treatments with asymmetric delay costs.
10 of the failed negotiations (62.5%) were in treatments
where the proposer could make an ultimatum offer.
Zillante, Read and Schwarz 1. Contingent contracts vs. contracts with a 1. 16 of 66 negotiations failed (24.2%). Neither of the
(2014)
contingent payment and a nontreatment variables had a statistically significant effect on
contingent payment (combination)
the rate of aggregation.
2. Buyer’s value is known to sellers vs.
2. Sellers rejected the buyers’ offers a total of 712 times.
buyer’s value is unknown to sellers
296 of these rejections (41.6%) were strategic, in that the
36

Kitchens and Roomets
(2015)

Contingent contracts vs. eminent domain
with fixed court costs

Isaac, Kitchens and Portillo 1. Fraction of properties required for
(2016)
assembly (4 of 4 vs. 3 of 4 vs. 2 of 4)
2. Presence vs. absence of an alternative
seller
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offer exceeded the seller’s property value.
3. Negotiations were faster with contingent contracts.
However, buyers’ earnings were higher with contracts
that included a non-contingent component.
1. Without eminent domain 1 of 12 negotiations (8.3%)
failed.
2. With eminent domain 3 of 44 properties (6.8%) were
purchased through forced sale.
3. Participants achieved 91.7% of the available gains from
trade without eminent domain and 93.2% with it. The
difference was not statistically significant.
4. Nash bargaining theory predicted that in the contingent
contracts treatment sellers who bargained earlier would
receive higher prices than those who bargained later.
However, sellers’ order in the queue had no effect on the
price at which they sold.
1. When assembly required 4 of 4 parcels 19 of 32
negotiations (59.4%) failed.
2. With a 3 of 4 assembly requirement 5 of 32 negotiations
(15.6%) of negotiations failed.
3. With a 2 of 3 assembly requirement 0 of 32 negotiations
failed.
4. When the buyer could assemble 4 of 4 parcels or
purchase from an alternative seller 1 of 28 negotiations
(3.6%) failed

Table 2. Experimental parameters
Parameter
Buyer exchange rate
Primary seller exchange rate
Alternative seller exchange rate
Distribution of primary sellers’ values,
Distribution of buyer’s primary value,
Buyer’s alternative value
Distribution of alternative seller’s value,
Negotiating periods
Delay cost per round
Set of fair market prices in contest

Value
$1.00 = 2 points
$1.00 = 4 points
$1.00 = 7 points
[50,100]
[100,250]
0.8V
[80,160]
5
5%
{
}

Table 3. Sessions and observations by treatment
Treatment
Baseline
Competition
Eminent Domain
Total

Sessions
5
3
5
13

Groups per Session
3
5
3
--

38

Negotiations
45
45
45
135

Table 4. Outcomes from our benchmark simulations of negotiations alongside observed results from our experiments. We tested for
differences between the benchmark and observed outcomes using Wilcoxon sign rank tests for continuous variables (opening offers,
number of periods, efficiency and contest spending) and a binomial tests for the percent of sellers forced to sell.

Measure
Average opening offer
Average number of periods in all rounds
Average number of periods when assembly produces surplus
Average Efficiency
Percent of sellers forced to sell
Buyer’s average contest spending
Seller’s average contest spending
† Differs from benchmark at p < 0.10
* Differs from benchmark at p < 0.05
** Differs from benchmark at p < 0.01
*** Differs from benchmark at p < 0.001

Baseline
Optimal Observed
75.8
58.6***
3.3
4.2*
2.3
3.75**
88.5%
81.2%**
-------
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Competition
Optimal Observed
68.5
64.4†
3.0
2.7
1.8
2.1
89.5%
89.9%
-------

Eminent Domain
Optimal Observed
45
56***
1
1.4***
1
1.2*
95.1%
80.6%***
0%
33.3%***
5
15.7**
5
15.9***

Table 5. The loss from delay in the Baseline Treatment is similar to the loss from contest
spending in the Eminent Domain Treatment
Points Available
Points Achieved
Loss from delay
Loss from failed assembly
Loss from inefficient assembly
Opportunity cost of inefficient assembly

Baseline
8,254
6,756
(81.9%)
1,237
(15.0%)
225
(2.7%)
36
(0.4%)
---

Competition
13,816
12,227
(88.5%)
1,114
(8.1%)
2
(0.0%)
169
(1.2%)
304
(2.2%)
--

1,498
(18.1%)

1,589
(11.5%)

Loss from contest spending
Total Loss

Eminent Domain
8,370
6,815
(81.4%)
157
(1.9%)
0
(0.0%)
249
(3.0%)
-1,149
(13.7%)
1,555
(18.6%)

Note: Key findings bolded.

Figure 1. Deviation of buyers’ average first and final offers from the theoretical prediction
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Figure 2. Difference between highest rejected offer and seller’s value

Figure 3. Average efficiency observed in the Baseline treatment and the simulated
counterfactuals with no seller holdout and no buyer holdout.
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